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A CREED OF THE FATIMIDS

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(a summary of the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, by Sayyid-nā 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. al-Walīd, ob. 612/1215),

by

W. Ivanow

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PREFACE.

The real nature of the religion of the Fatimids has always remained quite obscure. The original Ismaili literature has so far remained inaccessible, and the reports of different non-Ismaili authors were always imperfect and unreliable owing to their professed anti-Ismailite attitude. The absence of correct information on this subject has always created a serious obstacle in the path of research into the history and cultural influence of this illustrious dynasty. The story of Ismailism itself, and of its ramification into different sectarian movements also remained obscure because it was impossible to obtain the characteristic features of the standard form of the religion with which individual local forms could be compared.

It may be therefore useful to offer here a tentative review of the dogma of the official Ismailism of the Fatimids as given in the genuine Ismaili work which the followers of the religion themselves regard as classic and most authoritative. It is the well-known treatise, the *Tāju'l-ʿaqā'id wa ma'dinu'l-fawā'id*, by Sayyid-nā ʿAlī

b. Muḥammad b. al-Walīd, who was the fifth Yamanite *dā'ī*, and occupied this post from 605/1209 up to his death at an advanced age on the 27th Sha'bān 612/21-xii-1215. He is also the author of many other works which are all regarded as very authoritative, and are still much studied by the Musta'lian Ismailis.

The objection may be raised that the *Tāj* was written *after* the disappearance of the Fatimid Imams; the last of them, al-Āmir bi'l-lāh, was killed in 524/1130[1], probably more than fifty years before the book was compiled. The student may, however, safely rely on the information supplied by the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* for a correct idea of the dogmatic system of the Fatimids. Not only was the tradition quite fresh at the time when the book was composed, but the circumstances probably did not permit any serious evolution of the system. When the Ismaili leaders had to go through the most painful process of shifting from the capital of the empire

[1] Officially the Musta'lian Ismailis take the "disappearance" of the problematic infant son of al-Āmir, aṭ-Ṭayyib (who was "taken into concealment" in 526/1132) for the date of the beginning of the period of *satr*. As is known, the last caliph of the dynasty was deposed in 567/1171; but all caliphs after al-Āmir were not regarded as Imams, and in the *khuṭba* the reference was made to the Qā'im, i.e. the (unknown) Imam of the time.

to the wilds of the Yaman, where they were for all practical purposes completely isolated from the rest of the Ismaili world, they probably thought very little of anything except the preservation of their religious literature and tradition. The long period of epitomising work which fills the whole of the earlier part of the period of *satr*, or "occultation" of the Imams, clearly indicates the direction which their activities took at that time.

The *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* gives information about what can be regarded as the *official* religion of the masses, ruled by the Fatimids, and belonging to the "orthodox" Ismaili school. The people of higher religious education were also instructed in the religious philosophy of the sect, the *ḥaqā'iq*. This esoteric philosophy forms a very large subject by itself, and it will be better to deal with it separately elsewhere. It formed the *bāṭin* which was the crown of the *ẓāhir*, or exoteric doctrine. It may be noted, however, that there never was a clear boundary line between the *ẓāhir* and the *bāṭin*, and some points in the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* are not pure *ẓāhir*.

The way in which the dogmatical principles, explained in the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, were applied to religious life, belongs to the practice of the

Ismaili religion. For this we have one of the most important and exhaustive works in the Fatimid literature, the *Da'ā'imu'l-Islām*, by Qāḍī Nu'mān, which is the classic compendium of the Ismaili *fiqh*. With the help of his and of Sayyid-nā 'Alī's works one can probably form an exhaustive idea as to what the religion of an ordinary Ismaili was under the Fatimids, and in what it differed from other schools of Islam.

W. Ivanow.

Bombay,
January 1936.

Introduction.

1. *The Evolution of the Ismaili Creed.*

Before speaking about the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, it may be as well to have a glance at the works of Sayyid-nā 'Alī's predecessors which also relate to the subject.

Except for a comparatively short period of time when Ismailism was the official religion of the Fatimid caliphs (297–524/909–1130) in Northern Africa and in Egypt, the sect, in the course of its long history, almost always and everywhere was treated as heretical, and therefore was more or less severely persecuted. Its forced and continuous existence underground never permitted it to consolidate and unify its tenets by bringing them out, in broad daylight, for open and free exchange of opinions. There always was a great danger of falling into error or developing unauthorised and fallacious beliefs by different Ismaili communities which were scattered all over the Islamic world, from the Atlantic coast to Central Asia, and which had often to live their isolated lives, surrounded by hostile neighbours, and having only very little opportunities of referring matters to their spiritual centres.

Those responsible for the supreme guidance of the movement were apparently always alive to such danger, and did their best to counteract

it.[1] But the slow primitive means of communication which were at their disposal apparently never permitted even the most powerful and energetic central leaders to achieve the desired degree of unity and uniformity of the dogma of the sect. Most probably, taken as a whole, Ismailism never was uniform as a doctrine, but presented the picture of a bunch of parallel local movements which agreed in the main tenets, but greatly differed in details.

For this reason most probably no comprehensive formula of the Ismaili creed was ever introduced and generally recognised. The rapid process of evolution, the changes in the policy of the centre, etc., apparently never permitted any works to acquire wide circulation. Therefore, though there is no doubt that dogma-

1 There are many proofs in Ismaili literature that the authorities of the sect had not only to carry on controversy against non-Ismailis, but also often defend the correct form of belief against their internal heretics, *mārigs*, according to their terminology. Unfortunately, almost all of such controversial treatises, which would present great interest to every Islamic student, are only made of relative value by the most irritating habit of their authors, — never to mention either the name of the heretic, or the name of the sect. For instance, Sayyid-nā Ḥamīdu'd-dīn, in his collection of thirteen short treatises (cf. *Guide to Ismaili literature*, 125-135), devotes a treatise to the controversy against such a "*mārig*", without naming him, and another to the refutation of some principles of the Zaydīs, without mentioning their name. In his introduction to the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, Sayyid-nā 'Alī b. Muḥammad mentions a number of such heretical sects in the Yaman *(hādhihi'd-diyār)*, and in Syria. He accuses them of Shi'ite extremism *(ghuluw)*, *ḥulūl* and *tajsīm*, i.e. belief in incarnation of Deity in human form. He gives the names of such sects (which, unfortunately, are badly misspelt) as Ṣādiyya, or Ṣāriyya; Ḥākimiyya (= Druzes?); Dhahabiyya; Durriyya or Durariyya (= Daraziyya, Druzes?); Ḥasīniyya (?); Jalīliyya; Nuṣayriyya (or Naṣīriyya); Ta'līmiyya; unfortunately this is all that he mentions in this connection.

tical works really existed, none of them seemed to have been preserved, either from the pre-Fatimid or the Fatimid periods. The *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* itself came into existence, as the author mentions in his preface, because no such work was available to students at his time.

There always was at work yet another factor which prevented the early crystallisation of the creed. As is well-known, the Ismaili doctrine was always divided into two mutually supplementing parts, — the exoteric, *ẓāhir*, which occupied the position of the official religion in all dealings with the outer world, and the *bāṭin*, the esoteric philosophy, which was kept secret, and was intended only for the more advanced and intelligent members of the sect. As far as it is possible to ascertain, the demarkation line between both these was never authoritatively defined. All depended on local conditions. In places, where, as in Persia, the ground was prepared by popularisation of Sufic ideas, many elements of the *bāṭin* were inserted in the "lower" forms of religious doctrine. In the Arab West, where formal worship was always far more popular than philosophic speculations, the *ẓāhir* was almost the same as the Sunnite form of Islam, and even the most elementary esoteric doctrines were kept secret.

The Fatimid centre, and those circles which rallied round it, never ceased to emphasise the early principle that the *ẓāhir* and the *bāṭin* are interdependent, and cannot be separated from each other, just as the body cannot be separated from the soul in a living man. There

is no *ẓāhir* to which there is no corresponding *bāṭin*, just as there is no *bāṭin* which is not expressed by a *ẓāhir*. Both are the same, and both are indispensable. But there is no doubt that this was always only theory. The practice always recognized that the original, and the only true and real aspect of religion was esoteric wisdom, the *ḥaqā'iq*, and the *ẓāhir* was nothing but a concession to human ignorance, stupidity and weakness. God permitted it out of His mercy in order not to leave the great majority of mankind without a chance of salvation. The *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* itself, in spite of the best intentions of its author to the contrary, is a good example of this belief.

It is clear that the responsible leaders could scarcely commit themselves to drafting a fixed scheme of Ismaili dogma when the latter was still in the state of evolution. And it is also clear why a complete summary of the dogma could only be given after the disappearance of the living sources of new legislation, the Imams, when religious ideas became stable, and permitted the necessary systematisation and codification. But it is really remarkable that while Ismaili literature preserves a great number of the old *ḥaqā'iq* works, those dealing with the creed of the *ẓāhir* are extremely rare and imperfect.

Here are those few which are accessible at present, in their chronological order:

1. *Kitābu'z-zīna*, by Abū Ḥātim 'Abdu'r-Raḥmān b. Ḥamdān al-Warsīnanī ar-Rāzī, who

flourished in the early part of the iv/xth c.[1] He surely was one of the most erudite authors that Ismailism, and, generally, Islam has ever produced, and composed many important works of which only a few have been preserved. The work gives detailed information about different dogmas of the religion, but is designed as an encyclopaedia of religious terminology, not as a systematic treatise on dogmatics. In addition to this, it was purposely written in a rather evasive style, so that though really proving the Ismaili point of view, it avoids any conflict with orthodoxy by smoothing the "sharp corners", or simply passing over in silence the points of disagreement. Though at present regarded as a secret work, it was most probably intended for the general public as well as for the Ismailis.[2] It was composed in the beginning of the iv/xth c., and submitted to the second Fatimid caliph, al-Qā'im bi'l-lāh (322–334/934–946), ap-

1 See W. Ivanow, *Guide to Ismaili Literature*, No. 18.

2 It is mentioned in the *Fihrist* of Ibn Nadīm, and its general style seems to be influenced not by *taqiyya*, but simply by a desire to meet the requirements of the general reader. For instance, more than a hundred pages is devoted to explanation of Divine "names" (*asmā'*), i.e. attributes, which are not accepted by Ismaili theology. The question of keeping a certain work "secret" apparently depended not only on a desire not to divulge "heretical" ideas. There probably always was a considerable amount of, so-to-say, "internal" concealment, i.e. exemption of certain books from the list of those which could be read by every Ismaili. It was not only the case with books which are too difficult and technical, but also of their antipodes, those early works which, though in some parts still valuable, are in many respects too elementary, present the doctrine in a very undeveloped phase, and do not mention the dogmas which were introduced later on. For the people with no idea of evolution of the doctrine, and of historical perspective such books would be as misleading as those which are too difficult for understanding. The *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* seems to realise

parently soon after his ascension.[1] It contains a large store of interesting information, but, so far as the Ismaili dogma is concerned, it can only be used in conjunction with some other more explicitly Ismaili works.

2. *Da'ā'imu'l-Islām (fī dhikri'l-ḥalāl wa'l-ḥarām)*, by Qāḍī Nu'mān, or Abū Ḥanīfa an-Nu'mān b. Muḥammad b. Manṣūr at-Tamīmī (d. 363/974)[2], was probably composed some twenty-five years or so after the preceding work. It is the classic compendium of the Ismaili *fiqh* which is still much used by the Ismailis belonging to the Musta'lian branch. In accordance with the traditional plan of such compendia, it begins with the religious duties of man, and the first chapter, or book, is devoted to faith, *īmān*. This book contains a very valuable (though not systematic or exhaustive) account of Ismaili dogma, which occupies about one third of the *kitābu'l-īmān*; the second section is devoted to the establishment *(ithbāt)* of the institution of *imāmat*, with the help of the Coran and tradition, and the last section deals with the controversy with rival sects. The information regarding the creed can be summed up as follows:

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this difficulty, and warns the reader against accepting too elementary beliefs, — cf. art. 65.

1 So in the fifth volume of the *'Uyūnu'l-akhbār*, the famous history of Ismailism by Sayyid-nā Idrīs (see *Guide to Ismaili Literature*, No. 258).

2 Cf. "*Guide*", 64. The work was made subject of special study by A. A. A. Fyzee, who also published a biography of the author (JRAS, 1934, pp. 1—32). Cf. also his note in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam, sub voce.*

The doctrine as it appears in the *Da'ā'im* is (rightly or wrongly) based on tradition handed down from Imam Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq (d. *ca.* 148/765). Other early Imams are rarely referred to. Of the Fatimid caliphs only one is quoted on two occasions, namely al-Manṣūr (334–341/946–953), who composed a book, the *Tathbītu'l-imāma li-Mawlā-nā 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib*[1], which is here cited.

The author begins with the description of faith, criticising different formulas, and ultimately giving it the usual Muhammadan definition. Then he gives a sort of a creed:

1. There is no deity except God, who has no companions; 2. Muḥammad is His slave and His Apostle; 3. Paradise is true and Hell is true; 4. Resurrection *(ba'th)* is true; 5. There is no doubt that the Day of Judgment *(as-sā'a)* is coming; 6. God will quicken the dead from their graves; 7. The prophets of God, His Apostle (Muḥammad), and the Imams; 8. Recognition of the Imam of the time, acknowledgement *(taṣdīq)* of his rights, and obedience to his orders; 9. Necessity of acting in accordance with the commandments of God, and abstaining from what He has prohibited; obedience to the Imam, and his open recognition.

Faith *(īmān)* is assertion *(iqrār)*, and recognition, state of feeling certain, with a sense of complete consent, and acceptance of all implications of the belief in the unity of God, His having no wives, no children, no companions; ac-

[1] See "*Guide*", 51. The work is merely a collection of unsystematised traditions *(akhbār)*.

ceptance of prophethood, of the revealed books; and submission to all commandments of God. Faith can either be perfect, can decrease, and can increase.

Much further on he repeats the same creed in a slightly different form: belief in God, His unity, His Lordship *(Rabūbiyya)*, His Apostle, his *Waṣī*, the Imams, who are present in every period of time *(fī kull ʿaṣr wa zamān)*. These, as he adds, are the most important points of faith. To these is added the principle of obedience and acting in accordance with what God has commanded.

The difference between *Islām* and *īmān*: *īmān* is accompanied by *Islām*, while (profession of) Islam may not be accompanied by *īmān*. *Islām* is the external, *ẓāhir*, and *īmān*, hidden in the heart, the *bāṭin* of the same thing. Faith cannot be perfect without being faithful to one's own determination *(niyya)*. *Islām* is *iqrār*, or assertion, and *īmān* is also *iqrār*, but with the addition of knowledge, or recognition (*maʿrifa*). Whoever recognises God, His Prophet, and the Imam, and asserts this, he is a *muʾmin*, or faithful. Knowledge (*maʿrifa*) of God is a sign, or proof (*ḥujja*) from Him, His special blessing, bestowed upon him whom He wishes to guide.

God does make his proof (*ḥujja*) known on earth; the true *muʾmin* gives witness of this before mankind, believes in His Imam, and asserts this by his obedience to him. It is *kufr*, or intentional unbelief, to disregard the commandments of God, and not to acknowledge His Proof on earth.

The prophet with his Book was sent to mankind to teach the faithful to pray. Neither the Prophet, nor the Imams should be deified. As Imam Manṣūr (the second Fatimid caliph) says: "we are the slaves of God, just as other slaves of God, His creatures, just like other creatures. But he has given us a high position, appointing us the leaders (Imams) of His slaves, and proofs of His Divinity before His creatures". In another place, further on, the author states that the Imams are not similar in position to the Apostles of God; they receive no inspiration (*waḥy*), do not know the things that are hidden from ordinary people (*ghayb*), etc.

Love (*walāya*) to ʿAlī is a commandment (*farḍ*) of God. God made him, ʿAlī, the executor of the will of His Apostle, his companion (*walī*), his heir, vazir, and brother.

The Imams after ʿAlī are witnesses of the Divinity of God; they have been left by the Prophet together with his Book, as his *ʿitra*, or "close relatives". They are *ahlu'dh-dhikr*, i.e. those who recall to mankind the prescriptions of the religion. One has to obey the Imam as much as the *Waṣī* himself. Imamat is an indispensable dogma of the religion of God. Imams guide mankind towards God. They are the sole preservers of the knowledge which God has left with them, chosing them as deserving His honour and the blessing of His Light, making them the bearers of Truth, and the trustees in charge of it. They are in reality the *Aʿrāf*, or Purgatory, i.e. under them the soul after death undergoes purification prior to entering Paradise.

It is remarkable that the traditions and the quotations of the Coran on which the Ismaili theologians build the theory of Imamat, always remain practically the same. Qāḍī Nu'mān uses practically the same quotations which one finds five centuries later in various Nizari works, as, e.g., the *Kalāmi Pīr*.[1]

The Qāḍī adds many interesting statements about the *ẓāhir* and the *bāṭin*, and their difference, about the *ta'wīl*, and various secondary points of creed.[2]

3. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla* (or *Khazā'inu'l-adilla*). It was probably composed about fifty years later than the preceding work, some time towards the end of the fourth/tenth c. The name of its author is not known. It is usually included in the collection of 13 short treatises by the great philosopher of Ismailism, Sayyid-nā Ḥamīdu'd-dīn Aḥmad b. 'Abdi'l-lāh al-Kirmānī (d. about 410/1019). The Ismaili tradition does not regard this work as his; but there is no doubt that it belongs to his school, and was written under the strong influence of his ideas and terminology. It contains a clear statement that it was composed during the reign of al-Ḥākim (386–411/996–1021). It seems highly probable therefore that the work was composed by one of Ḥamīdu'd-dīn's disciples. The contents shows rather a weak and inexperienced hand. The work is divided into 28 *khizānas*, mostly on

[1] See W. Ivanow, *Kalāmi Pīr*, Bombay, 1935, chapters III and V.

[2] The Qāḍī's controversial and dogmatic works, unfortunately, are mostly lost, cf. "*Guide*", Nos. 89—98.

philosophical subjects, each consisting of a principle, and a double proof of it. These are the points which the author mentions: 1. Necessity of an "Initiator" (*Mubdi'*), or Creator of the world, and refutation of those who do not accept him. 2. He is not extant through some other cause. 3. He is not a substance (*jawhar*). 4. He is not in time. 5. He is not in space. 6. He is not a thing (*shay'*). 7. He has no attributes (*ṣifa*). 8. He is not limited by anything. 9. He cannot be described. 10. He is permanent or eternal (*thābit*), and has nothing to do by nature either with spiritual or solid objects. 11. There must necessarily be an intermediary between the Creator and the created, and such an intermediary is His Command. 12. Necessity of the existence of the principle of reason (*'aql*). 13. This *'aql* principle is the first creation (*mubda'*). 14. Nothing can be imagined as extant before the *'aql* principle. 15. The *'aql* principle is perfect, both potentially and in its working. 16. The *'aql* principle is the central principle of both worlds (i.e. physical and spiritual). 17. It is never a cause of ruin for anything. 18. The *nafs*, or living soul, is a willing, etc., entity. 19. It is spiritual and simple (*basīṭ*) in its essence, not physical. 20. It can never attain the position of the *'aql* principle. 21. The *jadd*, or act of attention, *fatḥ*, or comprehension, and *khayāl*, or voluntary combination with other elements in thought, are properties of the mind. 22. The existence of the seven basic elements, or letters (*ḥurūf 'ulwiyya*), which are the source of order and har-

mony in the world.[1] 23. The necessity of a Prophet as a messenger of God, a pure-hearted member of mankind. 24. Necessity of the *Waṣī* of the Prophet, whose purpose is to interpret to mankind the *sharī'a* which is revealed to the Prophet, and preached by him. 25. Necessity of the Imam. It would be absurd to think that God would send a prophet to introduce the *sharī'a*, and then leave mankind without a guide, "who would know the real meaning of the *sharī'a*, and would guide mankind to the Truth (*ḥaqīqa*)". 26. It is necessary to stick to *sharī'a* even after attaining the *ḥaqīqa*. 27. Necessity of *ta'wīl*, or allegorical interpretation of religion and scripture. 28. Necessity of resurrection of the dead, and refutation of those who do not believe in it.

4. To the same period as the preceding work belong the early sacred works of the Druzes, such as by Ḥamza, and his contemporaries. They have been studied by Silvestre de Sacy, in his "*Exposé de la religion des Druzes*", in two vols., Paris, 1838. The beliefs of the sect were considered in Fatimid circles as heretical, but in substance they are to a great extent those as of orthodox Ismailis of the period of the reign of Ḥākim. The one principle of their creed which appeared particularly objectionable to their opponents is the doctrine about manifestations of

[1] It is remarkable that the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* completely omits this rather important topic, which is discussed at length in all early Ismaili works, including the *Kitābu'z-zīna*, and the early Druze texts. Perhaps the author decided to regard this subject as belonging to the esoteric doctrine.

God in the form of different Imams, and ultimately in Ḥākim. Similar ideas always were very popular in Ismaili isolated communities, especially in the East, in Persia.

5. The period of the reign of Mustanṣir (427–487/1036–1094) was the time when Ismaili literature reached the climax of its development. The most important author of this time is Sayyid-nā al-Mu'ayyad fī'd-dīn Abū Naṣr Hibatu'l-lāh b. al-Ḥusayn ash-Shīrāzī (d. 470/1077). The collection of his 800 addresses (*majālis*), delivered by him on different occasions, forms a huge encyclopædia of Ismaili religion. It is, however, too chaotic, and too bulky for purposes of reference. The only genuine work, apparently belonging to that period, which is so far accessible in printed form, is the *Wajhi dīn* of Nāṣiri Khusraw (d. *ca.* 481/1088). It was printed in Berlin (1924), from a modern and not quite satisfactory copy preserved in St. Petersburg. The work is not of the *'aqīda* type, and its doctrine is not regarded now as orthodox by the Musta'lians. But there is no doubt that to a great extent it follows the general Fatimid creed of its time.

6. It is difficult to come at a correct conclusion with regard to the date of origin of the text of the oath which the Musta'lian Ismailis are still offering to their hidden Imam, at least once a year. The practice of taking the oath is of early origin, but its history is still quite obscure. It is differently styled as *'Ahdu'l-lāli*,

or '*Ahdu'l-awliyā*', or '*Ahd-nāma*, and appears in two forms: one to be repeated by men, and the other by women. Both are the same, the difference consisting only in the feminine forms of the verbs and adjectives in the women's version, instead of the masculine forms in that intended for men.

It is quite possible that the nucleus of the text goes far back into antiquity. The version which is in use at present has obviously been revised, at least in part, after the close of the Fatimid period, because the concealed Imam, Abū'l-Qāsim aṭ-Ṭayyib, is frequently referred to. But otherwise there are many indications that it was introduced at an early date, perhaps even before the victory of the Fatimids: the creed which it contains is remarkably primitive, and does not practically differ from the most orthodox creeds of that time, except for its very moderate Shi'ite element. Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333), who in this respect repeats the statements of Abū'l-Ḥasan (or Abū'l-Ḥusayn) Muḥammad Akh Muḥsin ibn al-'Ābid ash-Sharīf ad-Dimashqī (d. *ca.* 375/985), quotes it almost literally. Unfortunately, the text of Nuwayrī is not available to me, and I can only collate both these versions through the French translation given by Silvestre de Sacy, in his "*Exposé de la religion des Druzes*" (pp. cxxxvi–cxlvii of the introduction). Nuwayrī's version (probably deliberately) omits the long doxology with which the '*Ahdu'l-awliyā*' at present opens. It simply quotes the text of the oath, and in this the coincidence is remarkable. Some expressions

are apparently literally the same: belief in One God, His Apostle, the *Waṣī* of the latter (p. cxl), Imams, Paradise, Hell, resurrection (*ba'th*), necessity of prayer, *ḥajj*, fast, *zakāt*, and *jihād*, necessity of sincerity. And it ends with a long series of curses and retributions which are promised to him who dares to divulge the secrets, and to commit an act of treachery affecting the interests of the community. It seems that some expressions in the latter part are also literally the same in both versions. There is a considerable deviation only in the passage which immediately follows the belief in the Prophet. In Nuwayrī's version there is no mention either of the *Waṣī* or the *Imāms*. This is very strange. Most probably the omission is intentional, either on the part of the author, or of the scribes. Most probably the belief in Imams was really the central item. Nuwayrī, faithful to his hostile attitude, having quoted this creed, adds a remark (p. cxlvii) to the effect that, certainly, in all this there is no trace of any special infidelity. And that, surely, this was a mere trick to deceive the followers, while the oath of not divulging the secrets really pertained not to these quite innocent dogmas, but to those very heretical doctrines which the *dā'ī* was going to reveal after having taken the oath from his disciple.

It seems almost as certain that Nuwayrī has misunderstood the real cause. He lived in the fourteenth century, after the fall of the Abbasid caliphate, long since Shi'ism became a matter of fact all over the Islamic world. In reality, most probably, these terrible curses,

etc., were invoked upon the intending traitor in case he really divulges this very creed, or rather the dogma of Imamat, which in those early times was not merely a matter of religious opinion, but treason and offense against the state. If so, the formula must be of very old origin. The fact that its dogmas are more primitive than those in the first book of the *Da'ā'imu'l-Islām*, and correspond almost entirely with those of the *Kitābu'z-zīna* is also significant. Moreover, there are traces that its text was quite familiar to early authors. The expressions in which the beliefs about Paradise, Hell, the Day of Judgment, etc., are mentioned, are verbally the same here and in the *Da'ā'im*. Does this mean that the *'Ahd* is based on the *Da'ā'im*, or the latter incorporated the well-known expressions from the *'Ahdu'l-awliyā'*?

It may be added that the text of the *'Ahdu'l-awliyā'* has been completely translated into English in the work, which was printed in 1920 in Ahmadabad, under the title of "*Gulzare Daudi for the Bohras of India. A short note on the Bohras of India, their 21 Imams and 51 Dais, with their customs and tenets*", compiled and published by Mian Bhai Mulla Abdul Husain, B.A., K.H.M., P.C.S., Burhanpur. The translation, on pp. 125–138, is not particularly illuminating owing to inadequate English, swarms of misprints, etc.

It may be added that, as is well-known, the scholastic world in Islam always was very fond of various commentaries, super-commentaries, glosses and super-glosses to all school books

and treatises which for some reasons happened to secure general appreciation. Whole libraries can be composed of full sets of such commentaries, to only a few standard works. It is therefore really striking to find that such a practice is entirely unknown to Ismaili literature, although their standard works more than any others demand proper commentaries. These were usually given orally by the expert teacher, to his students. Such comments were never committed to writing, or, at least, never finally compiled into a book. And such an important work as the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* apparently never induced any one to compose a systematic commentary on it![1]

2. *The Tāju'l-'aqā'id.*

The *Tāju'l-'aqā'id* is a comparatively small work, which would take about three hundred pages in ordinary 8vo print. It is divided into a hundred *i'tiqāds*, or "beliefs", each having its number, and the main subject of the note indicated in a heading. Some of these notes are short, some long, some written in dry categorical style, some accompanied by a profusion

[1] There are two treatises which were composed by the son of the author of the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, — Sayyid-nā Ḥusayn b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. al-Walīd (the 8th *dā'ī*, who d. the 22nd Ṣafar 667/31-x-1268), with rather misleading titles: *'Aqīdatu'l-muwaḥḥidīn wa mūḍiḥa marātib ahli'd-dīn*, and *al-Waḥīda fī tathbīt arkāni'l-'aqīda* (cf. *Guide*, Nos. 241 and 245). But though their titles contain the term *'aqīda*, both are highly technical treatises on *ḥaqā'iq*, i.e. esoteric philosophy, and have little to do with the subjects studied in the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*.

of arguments, quotations from the Coran, etc. The style is very uneven, the language is almost invariably rather technical, sometimes ambiguous, and never as clear and exact as it should be in a creed. Generally speaking, it is difficult to call the work a masterpiece, and it falls much below the ordinary level of the Ismaili philosophic works.

In his introduction the author states that as there are many heretical movements in Ismailism, and much danger of the pious falling into error, great need is felt for a work which would give clear idea as to what is the true religion of the Ismaili Imams. Such book should serve as a standard by which one can test the correctness of his own belief. It should also be a guide for the beginner, one who enters the fold of the rightly guiding *da'wa*. Such book did not exist; therefore he compiled this.

As far as one can see, the author singularly failed to achieve his aim. The book which he compiled is obviously not for the beginner; it expects from the reader a fairly high education, both religious and philosophical, is full of details, allusions, implications, and, in spite of its professed disinclination, is completely dependent on the esoteric doctrine of Ismailism, to which it very often refers.

The impression is that the learned author, a theoretician and philosopher at heart, tried to produce a popular treatise, but, not possessing the talent of a popularisator, he made his work too difficult for the beginner, while at the same time he missed the opportunity of making

it as systematic and plain as he would have done had he decided to plan it as a purely learned and highly technical work. It is clear that on many occasions he had to struggle hard with the material which he had to handle, and very often was completely overcome by it. Sometimes he splits one principle into several notes, repeats again and again the same idea. On another occasion he tries to put into a single note several important doctrines, in such a way that all of them become mixed up. Sometimes he begins the note with an explanation of one principle, and then changes to quite another subject, only very imperfectly connected with the first. For this reason it is extremely difficult to sum up his notes: some of them are full of superfluous arguments, and are excessively detailed. In some others practically every sentence touches upon a new subject, which remains insufficiently explained, and it is not easy to decide which subject is the main in the article. His sense of proportion and perspective do not seem very acute, and it would appear as if he wrote this book gradually, during a long period of time, every time changing his style.

Just as all mediaeval Islamic theologians the author often mixes up the idea of a *belief* with a prescription of a practice, or a moral ideal. For instance, it is a *belief* if one says: "I believe in the reality of Jinns", or "I believe in the freedom of will". But it is not a belief if one professes: "I believe that it is right to turn towards the *qibla* when praying", or "I believe that it is good to be sincere, or trustworthy", etc.

The first sentence is simply recognition of a religious practice, and the second — of a moral ideal. The orthodox theologians call such "beliefs" — *ra'y*, i.e. religious opinion; but *ra'y* is a taboo with the Ismailis who reject its legal force. There are many notes of this kind, about twenty out of the hundred.

The most important feature of the work, which can completely defeat a student, is the recognition of the fact that the system of dogmas is entirely derived from, and depends on esoteric doctrine. This, from a religious point of view, may appear tactless: the first thing that the new convert wants to know is "the truth, whole truth, and nothing but the truth" about his new religion. And this work plainly tells him that what is offered is not the "whole truth". Surely, expert propagandists of Ismailism did not use such methods in converting the masses. For this reason the book appears to be primarily intended for teachers, the people who already profess a good knowledge of the doctrine, and only require an authoritative standard to test their beliefs, and to remove doubts.

All this makes it difficult to plan a complete edition and translation of the work before more is known about the evolution of the Ismaili doctrine in general, and especially about the development of the esoteric doctrine. At present such an edition and translation would be premature, and possibly may breed errors instead of helping to avoid them. So, for the time being, it will suffice merely to sum up the contents of every note, mentioning only the most

important ideas in it, and suppressing superfluous details.

In accordance with the most unfortunate practice of the majority of the Ismaili authors, Sayyid-nā 'Alī b. Muḥammad never refers in his work to his authorities, although on many occasions he vaguely recommends the reader to seek further information "elsewhere", in "books specially dealing with the subject".

The topics which are dealt with in the hundred articles of the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, can be roughly grouped in the following way:

i. 1-18 and 87: God.
ii. 19-22: Logos *('Aql)*.
iii. 23-24: Angels and Jinns.
iv. 25-29, and 34: Prophet and Revelation.
v. 30-33, 35-43, 47, 52, 58, 61, 69: *Waṣī* and *Imām*.
vi. 43, 68, 69: Shi'ism as the only true religion.
vii. 44: Refutation of *ra'y*, *qiyās*, etc.
viii. 45, 46, 48, 49, 73: Faithfulness to covenant with God.
ix. 47: *Taslīm*.
x. 51: Miracles of the Prophet.
xi. 52, 53, 60: The Coran.
xii. 54, 55, 58, 65, 66, 67, 70: Religion.
xiii. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 97: Philosophy and learning.
xiv. 60: *Ta'wīl*, or allegorical interpretation of religion.
xv. 66, 67: *Maṣlaḥa*, or God's intention to create the world in the best possible form.
xvi. 70, 71: Actions of man.
xvii. 71, 73: *Islām* and *īmān*.
xviii. 71, 81, 82: Life after death.
xix. 83, 84, 86, 87: Reward and punishment after death.
xx. 88: Sustainance *(rizq)*.
xxi. 89, 95, 96: Predestination and the Decree of God.
xxii. 83, 84, 90-94, 100: Soul.

xxiii. 39-43: "Historiosophic" ideas about 'Alī and the events in early Islam.

xxiv. 63, 99: Moral ideals.

xxv. Various religious injunctions and practices: 45, 48, 49: *bay'at*, or oath of allegiance. 46: necessity of obedience to religion. 50: correct date of beginning of the fast of Ramaḍān. 56: laudability of religious study. 59: necessity to act according to religious commandments. 61, 62, 63, 70: position of priests. 74-80: religious prescriptions, such as ablutions, prayer, etc. 97, 98: *taqiyya* and preservation of religious secrets.

Article 85, dealing with the *ṭabā'i'* most probably is a development of art. 23, dealing with belief in angels.

As one may see from this rough list of subjects, many of them are dealt in different notes, together with other subjects. The overlapping is as far as possible mentioned in the footnotes to the summaries of every article.

A very important question is a comparative analysis of the system, which would show the points of correspondence with the dogmatical systems of other sects of Islam, or deviation from them. The time has not yet come to give this, and premature attempts can only be abortive: it is mentioned above that the thorough understanding of the *ẓāhir* system of Ismailism can only be achieved when our knowledge of its esoteric system, and its evolution, is sufficiently advanced. Otherwise there is a serious danger of introducing various erroneous ideas which, as the experience shows, often take very long time to eradicate.

On the other hand, practically nothing is yet known about the real evolution of the later medi-

æval dogma of the various Sunnite schools. Works by I. Goldziher,[1] and D. B. Macdonald[2] are too general for this purpose. The detailed study of the early development of the Muslim creed, by A. J. Wensinck[3], is concerned only with the earliest period.

About the evolution of the dogmatic system of the Ithna-'ashari school, and of other Shi'ite sects, so far there is absolutely nothing apart from very few translations of some later works[4]. It would be not right to pick up any Sunni or Ithna-'ashari dogmatical work, composed about the same time as the *Tāju'l-'aqā'id*, and, comparing them, proceed to draw general conclusions. Such deductions can only be baseless and incorrect, for Ismailism, ever devoted to philosophic studies, was continually evolutionizing at a faster tempo than the other schools of Islam, in which such synthesis with philosophy arrived only much later. In each of these the course of evolution formed not a direct, but a zigzag line, with advances and retreats, or side movements. Thus it would be futile to guess or draw conclusions as to the similarity or dissimilarity of the processes, until an accurate general idea of the whole course of evolution in each of these schools is available.

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1 His *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, and *Le Dogme et la Loi de l 'Islam* (tr. F. Arin), Paris, 1920.

2 His *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, London, 1903.

3 His work "*The Muslim Creed*", Cambridge, 1932.

4 A. A. A. Fyzee is preparing a translation of an early Ithna-'ashari dogmatical work, the *Risālatu'l-i'tiqādāt* by Ibn Bābūya al-Qummī (d. 381/991), which is an interesting document of early Shi'ism.

A SUMMARY OF THE *TĀJU'L-'AQĀ'ID*

1. The world did not exist from eternity. It has come into existence after not being. Everything in it comes into existence, and then perishes, and it is obvious that this principle of transitoriness applies to the world as a whole. One has to seek for the cause of these changes, and, ultimately, for the primal cause of the existence of the world. It is impossible to think that a certain portion of the world is quiescent, and is the source of the movement and of the changes in the other portion, because if the world is ultimately one, there cannot exist such duality. Going up the chain of causation, one comes to a transcendent cause, the Primal Actor (*Fā'il*), whose production (*maf'ūl*) the world is. He is the *Muḥdith*, or one who has brought it into existence, while the world is *Muḥdath*, i.e. something that has been brought into being.

Nasafī, 309, uses the same argument, and almost the same expressions. Cf. also *Fiqh akbar* III (266, Art. 6). (Nasafī,—Najmu'd-dīn Abū Ḥafs 'Umar, d. 537/1142. References are to the pages of the English translation in D. Macdonald's *Development of Muslim Theology. Fiqh Akbar*,—as in A. J. Wensinck's work, *The Muslim Creed*).

2. The "Maker" (*Ṣāni'*) of the world must necessarily possess Absolute Reality; His non-existence is an impossibility. Everything in this changing world depends on Him, and can only continue by His existence. Our created intellects are incapable of understanding His real

properties, qualities, attributes. They are beyond the experience of our senses (*ḥiss*), limits of our reason (*'aql*), and power of our imagination (*taṣawwur*).

3. He (the Creator) is One (*wāḥid lā min 'adad*), i.e. not one of His kind, but simple in His Substance. His nature excludes every implication of plurality, composition, or variety. His working has no similarity with the action, potentially implied in elements, or causation. His being the source of all existence implies His being the Absolute; and His Oneness implies His being eternal, and free in His actions, which do not depend on any outside impulse. Human intellect cannot understand His nature (*huwiyyata-hu*) by direct cognition. It can know Him only in so far as an idea of Him is innate, and is laid in the design (*fiṭra*) under the scheme of creation.

Cf. Nasafī, 309. The question of the sources of knowledge about God again recurs when dealing with the *ṣifāt*.

4. The "Maker" (*Ṣāni'*) of the world is eternal (*qadīm*). This is a deduction from our experience of the world, so far as our intellect is capable of understanding it. The term *eternal* is applied to one whose existence has no beginning, and cannot be negativated.

5. He is not material body (*jism*).

Cf. Nasafī, 309, who, with other Sunnite authors, does not use the term *jism*.

6. He is neither a Substance nor an Accidens (*jawhar wa 'araḍ*) of things created.

Cf. *Khazā'inu'l-adilla*, 3 ; Nasafī (309) ; F. A. III, 266, Art. 9.

7. He is neither matter (*mādda*), nor form (*ṣūra*) of created things, because both these depend on something beyond them.

8. He does not in any way depend on His creatures, nor is He in need of anything from them; the created entirely depend on Him, and exist only through His will.

9. There are no deities besides Him. He is beyond all comparison, definition, limit, and beyond being comprehended by the senses, reason, or thought.

10. He does not resemble anything in this transient world, and does not come under any category applicable to created things or beings.

11. No names, i.e. attributes, can be associated with Him. A name indicates some peculiarity by which one thing in its class differs from similar things. He, being beyond comparison, and transcending human comprehension, cannot possess any such peculiarities.

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 7.

12. He has no limits (*ḥadd*), by which He could be defined or limited.

Cf. Nasafī, 309 ; *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 8.

13. Negation of properties (*ṣifāt*), which some people ascribe to the Creator, is a correct form of belief, because their recognition clashes

with the idea of the absolute unity of His nature. Properties can be either external, as in physical bodies (colour, weight, etc.), or internal, as knowledge, or ignorance, etc. The nature of the Creator does not permit application of the idea of anything internal or external to it. His real properties, which He may possess, are beyond our comprehension (*lā yumkin al-'ibāra 'an-hu bi-mā fī-nā min al-a'rāḍ wa' l-jawāhir*). We can only postulate some of His abstract properties, such as His being eternal, etc.

This seems to be a development of articles 11,16 and 18.

14. He is not in space.

15. He is not in time. Both these qualifications (*awṣāf*) are applicable only to His creatures.

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 4 and 5; F.A. III, 266, art. 12.

16. God is eternal, living, the One, Indivisible, the Head of the Universe (*aṣ-Ṣamad*). He never ceases to be the First, however far our imagination traces the sources of existence, and never ceases to be the Last, as He has no limits, by which He can be limited; no time can express His age. He is the Creator (*khāliq*) of things, their Renovator, after they cease to exist. He is never affected by illness or fatigue, neither moves, nor rests. He did not shape the world after any model (that existed prior to the creation), but produced it from nothing (*ibtidā'an*). The principal part of His worship is the attainment of knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of Him, complete recognition of Him, expressed

in the profession of *tawḥīd*, belief in His absolute unity. The proper form (*niẓām*) of the principle of *tawḥīd*, is the negation of all attributes, or properties (*nafyu'ṣ-ṣifāt 'an-hu*) which the human mind attributes to things created. God Himself gives proofs to mankind about Himself. His recognition forms the substance of the faith of all reasonable creatures. Proofs of His existence are laid in the innate religious instinct or sense, contained in the prototypal nature (*fiṭra*) of man. His miracles which He works are veils (*ḥijāb*) between the Creator and the created. *Lā diyānata illā ba'd ma'rifa*, i.e. there is no religiousness without (search for) knowledge. (The author gives many *ta'wīl*, or allegorical explanations of the many anthropomorphic expressions found in the Coran, in which "hearing", "seeing", etc., of God are mentioned).

The term *fiṭra*, most probably, can be better rendered by the modern term "instinct". The *ḥijāb* does not mean the veil in the sense of impenetrable obstacle, but rather conveys the idea of a dress, *libās, jāma, or dūn* of the 'Alí-ilāhīs; a Muhammadan woman when she comes out into the world cannot be seen by outsiders except when veiled (cf. de Sacy, I, 17 sq.). The idea that religion is based on search for knowledge of God, *ma'rifa*, is specially treated in articles 56 and 57, and, in another aspect, in 76. Cf. also F.A. III, 265, art. 1 and 4. The Druze ideas are given by de Sacy, I, 2-17; they come close to the later Nizari beliefs, as described in the *Kalāmi Pīr* (cf. p. xxxi-xxxiii, where references to the original text are given).

17. There cannot be two (or more) gods, sharing the position which the faithful recognize as that belonging to One God, because one of them must necessarily be the principal, or all

of them could not be omnipotent as being limited by others (*nāqiṣu'l-qudra*).

Cf. art. 9.

18. Human speech is powerless to express the ideas which are connected with the real nature of God. Words convey ideas, derived from experience of created things, their similarity or difference, etc., while God must necessarily be quite different from His creatures.

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 9. Also art. 13 and 16 above.

19. The visible world comes from the source (*mabda'*) endowed with (perceptible) properties, *ṣifāt*. God, as was shown above, is beyond human comprehension, and His real attributes or properties cannot be comprehended by the human mind or senses. Thus there must be an intermediary entity, brought into existence (*wujūd*) by God, i.e. the first of created things, through which (perceptible and conceivable) properties are introduced into the world. This is a great benefit bestowed by God upon mankind, who otherwise would not be able to understand the world around them. This first source (*mabda'*) is thus, in fact, the immediate creator, or *mubdi'* "initiator", of the world. This principle is that which came into existence first, and which occupies the highest position in the scale of creations (*marātibu'l-mawjūdāt*). The evolution (*ibdā'*) of the world received its (relative) reality (*ḥaqq*) from its existence (*bi-wujūdi-hi*), into which it has been brought by the One. It is the limit of the possible (intellectual) ascension of the creations. This would not be possible if

this (first) principle were not a creature (*mawjūd*); but, while being the *first* creation, it has direct touch with Absolute Reality. And it cannot also be really the first *mawjūd* unless it is also *one*, and thus perfect in its nature, as the first (immediate) cause (*'illat*) of the created world. In this quality it must be permanent and unchangeable (*bāqī 'alā ḥālāti-hi*), must be omniscient, omnipotent, etc., possessing all the perfect attributes. The principal attribute or quality (*ṣifa*) of this principle is life (*ḥayāt*), which is fundamental because it cannot be either intensified or weakened. Life is the substance (*dhāt*) brought into existence by the All-Highest, and the first perfect quality, *kamāl*. Life is the centre; all other qualities originate, or radiate from it. It is the first *kamāl*, giving birth to all other *kamāls*. All things follow it in existence through the existence of Life.

This is a crude popularisation of the philosophical theory of emanations, which is properly explained in the *ḥaqā'iq* treatises. The terms *'aqlu'l-kull* and *nafsu'l-kull* are familiar to every Ismaili; the author avoids using them, probably in consideration of the purity of the *ẓāhir*, with which he here deals. Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 11. The same idea, of the first *mawjūd*, was introduced by al-Ghazzali (cf. introduction), as a doctrine about *al-Muṭā'* (see *Mishkātu'l-anwār*, transl. by W. H. T. Gairdner, London, 1924, p. 55 sq.).

20. The Primal Source (*mabda'*) of the world is infinite, but has a beginning in time. It is only one, has no rival, and is unchangeable. It acts in accordance with the principles of logic, is *'āqil*. It is perfect in its nature, and comes short of Divinity or Godhead (*Rabūbiyya*) only in its being dependent for its existence on its Creator. This is the only imperfection which

it possesses. Its substance is simple, free from plurality. Its properties (*ṣifāt*) become apparent only by comparison with something that is not itself.

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 15.

21. There cannot be two primal sources (*al-mabda' al-awwal*); if they were, there would be a split and no balance in the world. There can be only one initial source, endowed with perfect attributes, free from imperfections in all that reached it from the Creator (*mūjid*), who is the only source of being, One after whom nothing can be imagined. This Primal Source of the Universe is what the Prophet in his revelation symbolically calls the *Qalam*, or the Heavenly Pen.

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 13 and 14.

22. This Primal Entity (*mawjūd*) is not self-existing, and depends for its existence on the Most High (*al-Muta'ālī*). It is (in philosophy) called the Primal Conscious Principle (*al-'aqlu'l-awwal*). It cannot be recognized by the intellect, but can be perceived by intuition (*ḍamīr*), and not by pondering over it (*iḥāṭata bi-tafakkur*).

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 12. Perhaps it would be better to translate *ḍamīr* by inner consciousness? What apparently the author intends, is the axiomatic self-evidence.

23. Belief in angels. They exist, and are of different ranks and kinds (*ḍurūb wa manāzil*), known under different names, entrusted with different duties; they possess different functions

in the spiritual (*'aqlī*) world, in the cosmic (*falakī*) system, and in the physical (*ṭabī'ī*) forces. Belief in angels is based on the Coran, which, surely, would not tell anything that is false. Man can see them only at the moment of death. There is a special *ta'wīl* explanation of the belief in angels, as it appears in the *ẓāhir*.

"Angel" in Ismailism usually symbolizes a force, especially in natural phenomena, such as that which causes the rotation of the sky, etc. Ṭūsī, in his *Rawḍatu't-taslīm* (JRAS, 1931, p. 550), devotes a special chapter to angels, *parīs*, etc. Nasafī, 312, omits the mention of Jinns.

24. Belief in Jinns. They also really exist, there is no doubt about this. They are of different varieties (*ḍurāb*). Some of them are benignant, others malignant. They are spirits, and their nature consists of fiery, airy, or dusty substances; some of them are faithful Muslims, others are kafirs. They are invisible to man's eye. The idea of the Jinn also has a *ta'wīl* explanation.

Strangely, nothing is said about the belief in devils, although Satan, or Iblīs, is frequently referred to. The learned Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, in his *Kitābu'z-zīna*, gives a very circumstantial account of different varieties of evil ones; owing to its antiquity, it is well worth study. Ṭūsī explains these as abstractions of evil and mischief.

25. *Waḥy*, or Divine inspiration, is what the mind (*nafs*) of the Prophet receives through his intellect (*'aql*), in the way of revelation, from the Will (*amr*) of the Creator. It does not come into conflict with the (intellectual) powers of the reasoning soul (*an-nafs an-nāṭiqa*), i.e. human mind, or common sense. The difference between revelation, *waḥy*, and other forms

of knowledge is that *waḥy* repeatedly descends upon the bearer, independently of his own will (*mafrāghan min-hu*). It cannot be either superfluous or deficient, as may be the case of knowledge depending on human personal effort.

26. Apostleship (*risāla*) is of two kinds: ordinary (*'āmma*), and special (*khāṣṣa*). The first is concerned with the character (*ṭab'*) and intellect (*'aql*). These also belong to the special Apostleship. The ordinary prophet is concerned with *dunyā*, or the matters of this world. The special Apostle deals also with *ākhira*, or life after death. Apostleship is an eternal Divine institution, which is at work from the time of Adam. It always remains within one family (*nasl*) of Prophets. The Prophet exceeds all ordinary mortals in his intellect. He is the teacher, guide, and (cultural) instructor of mankind. The purpose of his mission is the development of the higher faculties of mankind, leading them away from brutality and bestiality, by imposition of law, either by force or by mercy, by promise of reward or punishment. Every prophet continues the work started and continued by his predecessors.

Articles 26-29 show how remarkably little the idea of prophetship in Ismailism differs from the strict orthodox belief; cf. Nasafī, 312; F. A. III, 267, art. 22 and 23, which have parallels in F. A. II, etc. The ideas of the *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 23, of the Druze works, and of later Nizari system, also differ very little.

27. Prophets are never born from parents of loose morals, or in the family of godless people. Several Biblical legends and *ḥadīths*

are quoted to prove the noble descent of the Prophet Muḥammad, and of ʿAlī.

28. The rank of prophet (*nubuwwa*) is the highest which human beings can attain. The Apostle of God surpasses in virtue and knowledge every human being; everything in mankind and the physical world is under his authority. What he says is truth, which cannot be either disputed or contradicted. He is the one leader of mankind, who depends on Divine revelation, but never upon the help of man.

29. Our Prophet Muḥammad is the greatest (*afḍal*) of all Apostles. Six proofs of this are given: God addresses other Apostles by name, as "O Abraham, O Noah," etc., while He addresses Muḥammad simply as "O Prophet, O Apostle" (thus recognising him only as the Apostle, etc., *par excellence*). Secondly, God made him the nearest to Himself in the discharge of his mission, and commanded love for his family. Thirdly, God greeted different Apostles, but sent special greeting only to the family of Muḥammad (in the *sūra Yā-Sīn*). Fourthly, God made his *sharīʿa* final, not to be abrogated, and instituted the Imamat in his descendants, to continue to the Last Day. Fifthly, God made him an intercessor for mankind, although He did not do this in the case of any other Apostle. And, sixthly, because the miracles of all the other Apostles disappeared after them, while the miracle of Muḥammad, his Coran, remains, and will remain till the Last Day.

30. There are twelve proofs that 'Alī was appointed by the Prophet as the executor of his will (*Waṣī*) after him: 1. The appointment (*waṣiyya*) is commanded in the Coran (verses are quoted). 2. Appointing an executor is prescribed by the Prophet himself, in his tradition. 3. The Coran specially emphasises the necessity of the *waṣiyya* in religious matters, more than in those connected with property. 4. No one is exempted from the command to appoint an executor. 5. The predecessors of the Prophet, the great Apostles, always appointed their *waṣīs* from amongst their sons or near relatives. 6. The belief that the Prophet did not die intestate. 7. The belief that the Prophet promised punishment to those who return to idolatry after him. 8. The Prophet appointed 'Alī as his lieutenant in Madina before the war of Tabūk, just as Moses appointed Aaron as his lieutenant. 9. The Prophet who ordered us to appoint an executor of one's will could not violate his own commandment. 10. The Prophet himself commanded every general to appoint his successor in case of accidental death. 11. The Prophet appointed 'Alī as the most revered member of his family, to whom he entrusted his associates, bidding them to follow him. He also left to 'Alī his Book, sword, and many other items of his property. 12. The Prophet on several occasions explicitly called 'Alī his brother, extalling his position above everybody else's.

31. One who is appointed by the Prophet as the *waṣī*, i.e. the executor of his will, is the

greatest (*vfḍal*) of all men after the Apostle of God. His substance (*jawhar*) continues (*lāḥaq*) the substance (*jawhar*) of the Prophet, his virtue (*kamāl*) comes from the virtue of the Prophet. The meaning of the teaching of the Apostle, the mysteries of his law (*sharī'a*), the secrets of his community (*milla*) and the real foundations of his religion (*ḥaqā'iq dīnihi*)—all are in possession of the *Waṣī*; these cannot be acquired except from him. He interprets the religion of the Prophet, leads those who seek for knowledge, guards the correct *sharī'a*. Only he can ensure the necessary purity and trustworthiness of a religious authority, guaranteeing the reliability of tradition.

32. Imamat remains in the family (*ahl bayt*) of the Prophet, to the exclusion of everybody else. Only descendants of 'Alī and Fāṭima can be Imams. Religion (*dīn*) cannot be perfect without following them; the latter is a *farḍ*, or obligation. Faith in God and His Apostle is incomplete without faith in Imam, and *ḥujja*. Obligatoriness of belief in Imamat is established by the fact that religion (*dīn*) and the law (*sharī'a*) cannot be established, or be complete and correct without an Imam, or Leader. The Prophet appointed the Imams, and the whole of the Islamic community (*umma*) is the witness. The first Imams are Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. Their father, 'Alī, is, however, superior in rank to them. The community (*umma*) cannot elect an Imam, he is appointed by a *naṣṣ*, or explicit indication. Objections

of those who do not believe in *waṣāya* are refuted.

Such an idea of the Imam is found in early Fatimid works, especially the *Da'ā'imu'l-Islām*. Nasafī (313) says nothing about the method of the appointment of the Imam, thus revealing the difference between the Sunnite and the Shi'ite ideas. The belief that an Imam cannot be elected is directed against the Zaydīs. The idea that 'Alī was superior to all subsequent Imams was later on modified, especially by the Nizaris and Druzes, who believe that there are neither greater nor smaller Imams, and that all of them are merely different human bearers of the same Divine mission. Cf. art. 35.

33. The Imam is the heir of the Prophet, and the executor of his will. Imams Ḥasan and Ḥusayn left an inheritance to those who were the nearest to them by birth, spirit, substance and character, and this is all that mankind needs. As they knew that mankind needs a guide and teacher, they appointed one in the world, permitting him to inherit their knowledge (*ma'ānī 'ulūmi-humā*), so that it may be preserved. Mankind inherits from the Prophet the outward side of the religion, and its ordinances (*ẓawāhir wa aḥkām*). The *Waṣī* brings all this into a system (*niẓām*), and reveals its inner meaning. He and the Imams teach the knowledge of salvation, and the real meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) of the *sharī'a*, in its correct form, free from perversions.

The author omits all mention of the rules pertaining to succession, of the actual genealogy of the Imams, which is all-important to an Ismaili, and of many other matters, such as the theory that the world can never remain without an Imam, or that there can only be one Imam at a time, etc. The importance of the Imams Ḥasan and Ḥusayn was always emphasised by the Fatimids who laid stress upon their descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima.

34. Apostleship (*risāla*) is not continuous. God sends an Apostle from time to time, in order

that he may put the affairs of mankind into order, when they become entirely confused, and when the world resembles a lunatic asylum.

35. The office of the *Waṣī*, or the executor of the Prophet's will, is not transferred after the death of the former, but comes to an end.

The *Waṣī* obviously is an Imam who, in addition to his other virtues, has the privilege of being the associate of the Prophet, entrusted with the executorship of his will. Such distinction was apparently required for various schematic constructions in the esoteric speculations. Cf. art. 32, note.

36. Imamat, contrary to Prophetship and *Waṣāyat*, is a permanent institution in the world. Its permanency (*istimrār*) is a part of its nature. The Imam is the heir of all that is left by the Prophet, with regard to the *sharī'a*, and the knowledge that is left by the *Waṣī*, explaining the religion. The Imam is the guardian of the community (*umma*), and its leader. The work of the Prophet and the *Waṣī* is to last for the whole of the (millennial) period (*dawr*), and the institution of Imamat is the only way to achieve this.

37. There is no *ghayba*, i.e. the time when the Imam entirely disappears from the world, and does not control it. The Imam cannot disappear completely, but even if he is not manifest to the masses he is in touch with the chosen ones, and his whereabouts are known to them. They may even point him out to those of the ordinary followers who can be trusted. If it happened that the Imam completely ceased to exist, religion, left unguided, would fall into error

and perish, together with even those of the believers who did their best to be faithful. God in His mercy will never permit such a thing to happen. And the Imam, being *ma'ṣūm*, or infallible, cannot commit any act which deprives him of his Imamat.

The beginning of this article is obviously directed against the Ithna-'asharis, and all other sects (as, e.g., the Druzes), who believe in hidden Imam.

38. The world will never remain without a "Proof of God" (*ḥujjatu'l-lāh*), i.e. either a Prophet, or *Waṣī*, or Imam, or without one who can keep it in order, manage the organisation of the hierarchy of teachers (*ḥudūd*), guard the established practices (*marāsim*), and preserve them against deterioration. The Imam is the centre of the community in the absence of the Prophet, and although personally mortal, as every human being, his line of hereditary descent is permanent in the world. His genealogy is always known; he always follows the religion of his forefathers, never deviating from their beliefs. He never follows any one in religious matters; no one is superior to him in this respect.

39. 'Alī's not taking steps after the death of the Prophet to take upon himself the office of khalifate was neither due to his inability (*'ijz*), nor to neglect (*tafrīṭ*). He was acting in accordance with the instructions of the Prophet, according to which he had first to carry on propaganda, and then only to take strong measures. As authority, 'Alī's conversations with Ash'ath, Ṭalḥa, and others are referred to.

This apparently is a Shi'ite reply to the usual point of the Sunnite creeds concerning the first caliphs (cf. Nasafī, 313; F.A. III, art. 29; F. A. II, art. 10, etc.).

40. One who is (in some respect) inferior to others (*mafḍūl*) cannot be an Imam. Also an idolater (*mushrik*), or one who does not keep the covenant (in some MSS. there is *nāqiḍ*, i.e. *nāqiḍu'l-'ahd*, but in other copies—*nāqiṣ*, i.e. perhaps "defective", either physically or mentally). A man cannot be an Imam if he has practised idolatry even for a moment in his life, though later on he embraced Islam.

41. Imam cannot be elected by the community. He is the absolute ruler, who imposes his final commandments (*ḥudūd*) upon his followers. The principle of *ijmā'*, or consensus of the community in accepting certain religious laws and practices, is completely false. If some one accepts this principle, he should regard Muḥammad the Prophet as not a real Prophet, because all the peoples to whom he addressed his message, or at least the majority of them, did not at first recognize him as such,—the heathens, Jews, Christians, Sabians and Zoroastrians. Only the Imam, appointed by God is *ma'ṣūm*, or infallible, but the community, obviously, cannot be considered as infallible.

Cf. above, article 32. The rejection of the principle of the *ijmā'*, or consensus of the community, is not only limited to this particular occasion; the Ismailis reject it completely.

42. Every one who makes an attempt on the rights of an Imam is like Ṭāghūt (the demon). This means that every action intended to oppose

the Imam, to prevent him from occupying his office, etc., is to be considered as a great sin.

43. The *umma*, or all the Muhammadan nations in their entirety, became split and fell into disagreement (*ikhtalafat*) after the death of the Prophet, thus taking the way of error. This was chiefly due to their reluctance to follow the guidance of the *ahl Bayt*, i.e. the Imams. Only a small group amongst the Muslims remained faithful to the commandments and the will of the Prophet, suffering for this reason at the hands of different oppressors. Only the Ismailis preserved the correct belief, and followed the true path.

Cf. also articles 68 and 69.

44. The principles of *ra'y*, or using commonsense in the religious matters; of *qiyās*, or using logical analogy in deciding religious questions, in the spirit of law and general religious ideas; of *ijtihād*, or following the opinion of an expert in religious learning; and of *istiḥsān*, or desire to introduce improvement and adjustement of religious practices,—all these are rejected. The chief authority for this attitude is Imam Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq. And the basis of such a ban is the capability of human nature to err, despite the best intentions.

On these principles cf. articles 56 and 75.

45. Swearing allegiance (*bay'a*) to the Imam is obligatory to every *mu'min*. Whoever wants to join the *da'wa*, or the religion of Muḥammad the Prophet, has to possess faith, *īmān*,

and to enter into a covenant (*mu'āhada*) with him on behalf of God. Disloyalty to the Prophet is in reality disloyalty to God who has sent him. Those who have sworn such allegiance must obey, and keep their promise with all faithfulness. Women must also swear allegiance, going through the ceremony of *mīthāq*, in the same way as men. They must act righteously, oppose everything that is unlawful (*ḥaram*) in the *sharī'a*, and keep secret those things and that religious knowledge which are entrusted to them.

Cf. article 49, on punishment for violation of the covenant.

46. Obedience (*ṭā'a*) to all dictates of the religion is the most important duty of the faithful. Whoever obeys the commandments of the founder of the religion (*ṣāḥibu'sh-sharī'a*), by complying with them, obeys the orders of God. Salvation can be attained only through such obedience, which should be complete, in word, action, desire and thought (*bi'l-lisān wa'l-jawāriḥ wa'l-qalb wa'l-yaqīn*). "Whoso obeys the Prophet he has obeyed God" (Coran, IV, 82).

47. Complete surrendering, or submission of one self (*taslīm*), and the following of some one (*ittibā'*), are of two kinds, right or wrong. The *taslīm* of the proper (*ṣawāb*) kind is when one entirely submits himself and his own will to the guidance of the religion of the Prophet, of his commandments (*amr*), and the command of the Imams from the house of the Prophet (*ahl Bayt*), and unreservedly follows

these. The Imams are the rightful heirs of the Prophet, possessing his Book, knowing its hidden meaning, and its explanation (*ta'wīl*). They are the *ahlu'dh-dhikr* and *ūlū'l-amr* after him. The faulty form of the *taslīm* is that in which one submits himself voluntarily to the will of various pretenders, and sees eye to eye with them; or when he simply seeks a higher position or wealth through them, well knowing that they have no real right to pose as religious leaders.

On the Druze ideas about *taslīm* cf. de Sacy, II, 647 sq.

48. The people who really obey God and His Apostle, and are therefore entitled to receive the "mighty hire", or great reward (often referred to in the Coran), are those who faithfully keep their covenants, and strictly observe their oath (*al-mūfī bi'l-'uhūd wa'l-multazim li'l-mawāthīq*).

Cf. article 45, on taking the oath.

49. Whoever breaks his covenant and violates his oath of allegiance, disobeys God and His Apostle, and, by doing so, is cursed and punished by "painful punishment" (also often referred to in the Coran).

Cf. article 45.

50. The fast of Ramaḍān should be started after one actually sees the new moon only in those cases in which he cannot obtain correct information about the date of the real (astronomical) beginning of the month. The Prophet prescribed such way of beginning the fast only

to those who live alone, are on a journey, and have no competent teacher (*fāḍil*) at hand who could (scientifically) determine the real date.

However difficult it is to believe that the Prophet, in the state of the Arab astronomical ideas of his time, could ever have given such a prescription, or even raised the question, it is a fact that this idea appears at a very early date in Ismailism. Cf. de Sacy, II, 510 sq., who mentions that this matter became prominent in Egypt as soon as Jawhar, the Fatimid general, had occupied the province. There are many works in Ismaili literature, and many are still being composed, in which this subject is thoroughly studied.

51. Miracles of the Prophet, which he manifested to mankind while establishing his religion (*sharā'i'*), are to be regarded as true and real (*anna-hā ḥaqīqa*). They are of three different classes: 1. supernatural phenomena produced by him (*ikhrāqu'l-'āda*); 2. the greatness and sublimeness of his teaching (*nuṭq*) which no one can imitate; and 3. his virtues and excellent qualities (*faḍā'il*), which he possessed in his capacity of the Perfect Man.

52. Verses of the Coran can be abrogated only by other verses of the Coran itself. Copies of the Coran must be made with great care, lest mistakes kreep into religion. The *ahl Bayt*, i.e. the Imams, possess hereditary knowledge of the Coran, guarding it against perversion and errors. The Book was left by the Prophet to his followers together with his *'itra*, or "close relatives".

53. The Coran contains all religious knowledge (*al-'ulūmu'd-dīniyya*), both in letter and spirit (*ammā lafẓan wa ammā ma'nā*). Philo-

sophy, *ḥikma*, is what is contained in the Coran (*hiya ma'ānī mā ūdi' fī'l-Qur'ān*). It contains all that mankind needs to be guided in religion and in wisdom (*shar'an wa 'aqlan*).

54. *Sharī'a* agrees with *ḥikma*, or philosophy and science. It is not right to maintain that the latter (*al-ḥikma wa'l-falsafa*) are different (by nature) from religious wisdom (*al-ḥikmatu'sh-shar'iyya*). God created mankind capable of reasoning and knowing (*ḥukamā' wa 'uqalā'*), and it would be absurd to think that He should prescribe a law (*shar'*) for them which would not be based on judgement and reason (*ghayr muḥkam wa ghayr ma'qūl*). The law which is given to them must therefore be based on the same principles of logic as other forms of human knowledge. Religious prescriptions differ only in so far as they are concerned with the outer (*ẓāhir*), or the inner (*bāṭin*) meaning of religion, and both are within the competence of reason, because it is applicable both to the physical and spiritual phenomena. The normal man then can only act rightly when his physical vision (*baṣar*) is helped by mental vision (*baṣīra*), which is based on reason ('*aql*).

55. Religious duties (*taklīf*) consist of proper actions ('*amal*) and necessary knowledge ('*ilm*), which are obligatory to every able bodied adult of sound mind. Every one who has come out of the age of childhood is under an obligation to follow this commandment. They are

thus divided into two categories, those which are connected with the body (*badanī*), and those connected with the mind or intellect (*'aqlī*). Compliance with the prescriptions of these two classes of duties is rewarded, and their neglect is punished by God, from whom nothing is hidden. One cannot take up only practices prescribed in connection with the body, disregarding those which are connected with mental life, and *vice versa*, because spirit and body cannot exist separately, but depend on each other.

56. *Baḥth*, or investigation, and *naẓar*, or reflection and pondering over religious matters (*'ulūmu'd-dīn*) are a (recognized) way of learning (*istifāda*), but only when conducted under a properly qualified teacher. Ideas which cannot be approved of by him are errors (*ḍalāla*). Instruction (*ta'līm*) of qualified teachers is the proper basis of faith and of religious law (*aṣlu'd-dīn wa'sh-shar'*), when coupled with the *'iṣma*, or infallibility. Every form of excess (*ziyāda*) in religious matters is to be avoided, as also every form of following the methods of *ijtihād*, *ra'y*, *istiḥsān*, and *musā'ada* (concessions to the lower instincts).

57. It is obligatory (*wājib*) to seek knowledge (in the religious field),—*ṭalabu'l-'ilm*. Similarly, it is obligatory (*wājib*) to teach, and thus transfer it to others, who are fit and capable of learning, and deserve it. Both these, i.e. learning and teaching, are indispensable duties (*farīḍa*) of every Muslim. They are important

both for the (spread and preservation of the) religion, and for (progress and betterment of) life in general (*li'd-dīn wa'd-dunyā*).

Cf. article 16, in which the same matter is referred to amongst other ideas.

58. Religious life (*al-a'mālu'sh-shar'iyya*) forms a system, like a living human body: the Prophet may be compared with its head, his lieutenant (*khalīfa*) resembles its heart, the associates (*aṣḥāb*) of the latter are like its senses or limbs, its religious acts resemble the movements of the body, etc. Thus if a man has complete faith; and acts in accordance with the prescriptions of *sharī'a*, his religious life and its progress are sound. But if the balance is upset by attaching more importance either to the *bāṭin* side of the religion, or to the *ẓāhir*, while the opposite side is neglected, the system ceases to work correctly. Therefore there always must be in the world some one (*shakṣ dīnī*) who has the power to keep the balance right by his guidance in religious matters. He is one "whom God raiseth in this world", and who by his *ta'līm*, or religious teaching, helps the soul to guard itself from sin. Souls can easily fall in error without this, straying from the path of obedience to God, and descending the path of mischief and neglect of duties. He brings them back to obedience to God, thus making them different from those who live in bestial ways.

59. Propoganda of religion, of commandment of what is considered as proper, and of prohibition of what is considered as improper,

is the duty of properly qualified persons (*wujūb ad-duʿā' ilā'd-dīn wa'l-amr bi'l-maʿrūf wa'n-nahy ʿani'l-munkar ʿalā'l-ʿulamā'*),—and of nobody else (*dūn ghayri-him*),—within the limits of their possibilities (*istiṭāʿa*). The author quotes many verses from the Coran in which this is explained. It is a duty of each one of the faithful (*mu'min*) to enjoin what is right, as far as he can, and to prohibit what is wrong, within the limits of his possibilities (*istiṭāʿa*), whether by tongue, by hand, or by heart. Those who are prevented from this by the practice of *taqiyya*, or by fear (of persecutions), may by the mercy of God receive their reward. Those who wish to act rightly, but cannot, and do wrong, being conscious of this, injure their faith; they will be punished. This especially applies to those who know how they should act, and who talk much about this, and yet ultimately do wrong, for consideration of some material advantages.

Cf. also art. 97. It is not quite clear whether the '*ulamā'*, referred to here, are ordinary priests, or Imams. The verses of the Coran, quoted here, attribute such *amr* and *nahy* to prophets. The obscurity may be intentional; it may (as in art. 97 and 98), be a later addition, intended to uphold the interests of the priestly class. Cf. art. 61.

60. *Ta'wīl*, or authoritative allegorical interpretation of the Coran and religious prescriptions, is indispensable (*wājib*) for the right understanding of the religion, in all its aspects. This equally refers both to the plain (*ẓāhir*) form of the religion, and to the *bāṭin*, or abstract. For instance, one may wonder why certain injunctions of the *sharʿa* have this or that form, not something different; or why Muḥammad the

Prophet was sent to Arabs, and not to any other people. Such questions are answered by *ta'wīl* of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. (The author quotes many verses of the Coran, in which *ta'wīl* is given for explanation of the messages of some ancient prophets). The Prophet, who addressed not a highly cultured people, but Arabs, such as they were at the time, would necessarily speak only about plain matters connected with the visible world. But every such statement in the Coran implies also a reference to the abstract (*'aqliyya*), and to the spiritual (*rūḥāniyya*) meaning of it; these require special elucidation, by a qualified person, who possesses the necessary knowledge. Much is written about this elsewhere.

61. Imams have special deputies in different parts of the world, whose duty is to guide the people to whom they are sent.

62. One who blindly follows the religion of his ancestors, by tradition, without having ascertained for himself whether it is correct or wrong, is not right. He should know, and act in agreement with the Coran and *sunna* (or traditional practice of the Prophet), as taught by the recognized leaders belonging to the family of the Apostle (*ahl Bayt*) (or their deputies). It is equally wrong either to change continually one's religious opinions, or to stick obstinately to the beliefs of one's forefathers, out of intentional conservatism, even when he is not satisfied with them, and does not regard them as reliable.

63. Love for the sake of God, and hatred of all that opposes Him, benefaction (for His sake), *'aṭā'*, and *man'*, or resistance of what is wrong, are necessary elements of piety (*dīn*).

64. Association with unreliable people, *munāfiq*, is undesirable. Such *munāfiqs* are those who ridicule religion, or its priests, outwardly accepting the beliefs of it, but inwardly having no faith in them.

65. In many places in the Coran one finds that the Prophet preached only belief in One God (not mentioning the other points of the creed). Such rudimentary *da'wa* (*ad-da'watu'l-awwala*) was permissible only to the Prophet himself, at the beginning of his mission, and is no longer sufficient. The primitive formula belongs to the *fiṭra* or innate religious sense of mankind, and is the greatest proof of the truth of the *nubuwwa*.

66. The earlier religious systems (*sharā'i'*) are all abrogated by the *sharī'a* of Muḥammad the Prophet. Such periodical abrogations and renovations (*tajdīd*) of the revealed religion are an advantage (*maṣlaḥa*) to mankind. The present *sharī'a* has to remain to the Last Day, when God will fill the earth with justice and equality as much as it is now filled with oppression and lawlessness.

The idea of *maṣlaḥa*, or benefit of mankind, intended by God, is inherited by Ismailism from the Mu'tazilites; it was opposed by the Sunnites, cf. Nasafī, 311, and F. A. III, 266, art. 20.

67. The abrogation of the earlier religious systems is due to the advantages (*maṣāliḥ*) which the wisdom of God intends for mankind. When God created the world, He sent His prophets with their different systems of law and religion in order to protect the human race against its own destructive and internecine instincts. But in the course of time mankind begins to neglect the injunctions of *sharī'a*, chaos is gradually overtaking it, and God, in His mercy, sends a new Apostle, to establish a new religion, which abrogates that given by his predecessor.

Cf. art. 34. The author obviously refers to the theory of the *dawrs*, or prophetic epochs, lasting about one thousand years each, into which the continuous Divine guidance of mankind is divided.

68. True religion (*al-ḥaqq*) is always the lot of only a small minority of mankind, as can be proved from the Coran. The great majority usually take up various false and mistaken beliefs.

This pessimistic reflection is common to all branches of the Ismailis. Ṭūsī (JRAS, 1931, p. 550) devotes to it a special chapter (*taṣawwur* xviii).

69. The (real) piety (*dīn*) and faith are found only in Shi'ism (*tashayyu'*), just as the (real) following (*ittibā'*) of the practice (*sunna*) of the Prophet, of his commandments, and of the members of his family (*ahl Bayt*), to whom the Shi'ites are firmly attached in accordance with the order of the Apostle of God. The Imams are the *'itra*, or "close relatives", whom the Prophet left on his deathbed to his followers, together with his Book. No one is equal to them (*lā yuqās bi-nā aḥad*). The Prophet

predicted the splitting up of the Islamic community into seventy three sects after his death; of these only one is that which brings salvation (cf. art. 43). It is the one which follows the Prophet and his descendants, *ahl Bayt*, who are the Ark of Noah giving religious salvation. The Prophet himself ordered his community to follow ʿAlī and his *dhurriyya*. ʿAlī is greater than both his sons, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. *Walāya*, or support for ʿAlī, and love for him and his cause, is the greatest religious virtue in Islam.

70. One must do his best to act in accordance with prescriptions of the religion as far as it is within his possibilities. Excess in anything is undesirable, just as trying to achieve the impossible, while sacrificing something that is essential. The ideal attitude of the true Muslim is rigid allegiance to what is prescribed by God, *mafrūḍāt*, and careful discharge of his duties.

This implies condemnation of Sufic practices and asceticism, which were not encouraged by the Fatimids.

71. Life means activity, and the existence of the visible world consists of actions. Every action may be either good or evil, and God, surely, will either reward or punish it. But such rewards or punishments are awarded after death,—this world is not the place for enjoying the first, or permanently suffering from the second.

On life after death cf. art. 81.

72. Islam is verbal assertion, *qawl bi'l-lisān* (of one's belonging to the religion of

Muḥammad the Prophet), together with the adoption of its psychology (*nuṭq bi-hi*), realisation that this implies submission (*inqiyād*) and obedience (*ṭā'a*) to the commandment of professing (*shahāda*) all that is prescribed by Muhammadanism: monotheism, belief in prophetship, surrender to the ordinance of God (*taslīm*), abiding by them, giving up opposition to them, etc., whether such things please one or displease. One who verbally professes Islam is a *Muslim*, not a *Mu'min*. Profession of Islam is the gate by which one enters when seeking for the higher truths (*ḥaqā'iq*) which are revealed by the Prophet. By this gate one enters the system of duties (*ṭā'āt*), which make his soul engage in the reflection about the nature of the commandments of God, the obligatory character of the prescriptions of the *sharī'a*, etc., either explicit (*ẓāhir*), or implicit (*bāṭin*).

Cf. Nasafī, 312; F.A. III, art. 24; de Sacy, II, 522 sq.

73. Faith (*īmān*) is not only professing (*qawl*), but also acting (in accordance with the prescriptions of the religion), and determination (*niyya*) to act accordingly. It is by faith that one can be saved. By faith one asserts the truth of the mission of the Prophet. Faith gradually becomes distributed in the limbs of the faithful, so that his movements and actions (automatically) become in agreement with the principles of obedience to God, or prescribed forms of worship. There should not be any discrepancy between word, intention and action. If such discrepancy appears, this indicates that

the man is insincere (*munāfiq*). These three elements of faith depend on each other. In a true *mu'min* they are always present. By their union he attains the state of perfect morality, and lives in full agreement with the injunctions of the revealed religion.

Cf. Nasafī, 312; F.A. III, art. 24; de Sacy, II, 652.

74. Purity (*ṭahāra*) is of two kinds: ritual purity, which is attained through the prescribed purifications by water, or, in its absence, by clean earth; and, secondly, internal or spiritual (*bāṭin*) purity, which means the purity of heart, its being free from everything unclean, i.e. from all that may defile it by sensuality (*aṭ-ṭabī'a ash-shahwāniyya ash-sharīra*), which is an evil and Satanical factor (*jawhar*). It perverts and defiles all good and ideal desires which God inspires into the heart, inducing man to do evil. One can only purify himself from (the ordinary) uncleanliness by "real water" (*al-mā' al-muṭlaq*). Similarly, one can only purify himself from spiritual uncleanliness, coming from doubt and disobedience to God, by the "water of knowledge" (*mā'u'l-'ilm*), which is the knowledge of the real meaning of things, as these are explained by religious teachers, who received this wisdom originally from 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. This wisdom is partly enshrined in the religious books which can be read and understood by those who possess sufficient education and intelligence.

Articles 74-80 give elementary *ta'wīl* of the fundamental religious prescriptions; this subject is specially dealt with in *ta'wīl* and *ḥaqā'iq* works.

75. Water, by which ritual ablutions can be made, should be beyound doubt (as to its purity). Similarly, spiritual water, by which one's heart can only be purified, should be beyond doubt as to its pure origin. Certainty as to its purity can only be attained when it comes directly from the Prophet himself, through 'Alī and Imams, his successors. One must be perfectly sure as to its not being defiled by arbitrary perversions of interested parties, or by incidental errors from which human mind can never be quite safe, from *ijtihād*, *qiyās*, *ra'y*, and all other possible forms of alteration and adulteration.

About *ra'y*, etc., cf. art. 44 and 56.

76. Prayer (*ṣalāt*) is of two kinds One is the ordinary prescribed prayer, *namāz*, which consists of the recitation of prescribed formulas, accompanied by special genuflexions, prostrations, etc., which are all discussed in details in special books devoted to these matters. All these details are based on the expamle of the angels and great prophets who introduced different practices in their time. This form of worship, expressed in proper words and movements of the body, belongs to the field of what is called the "worship by actions", *al-'ibādatu'l-'amaliyya*. The other form of prayers is spiritual; it is based on high training of the soul and consciousness, and belongs to the sphere of the "worship by knowledge", *al-'ibādatu'l-'ilmiyya*. It is differently described by terms such as "attachment" (*ittiṣāl*) to God, or "approachment"

(*taqarrub*) to Him, or "union" (*ittiḥād*) with Him, or connection with the higher world (*al-irtibāṭ bi'l-malā'i'l-a'lā*). It has nothing to do with any fixed formula, or prescribed genuflexions or prostrations, or any special movements of the body. It can only be performed in spirit, by the force of continuous meditation, or by the power of concentration (*bi-quwwati'l-irtibāḍ wa shiddati'l-muḥāfaẓa*), by persistent effort to preserve spiritual purity, by keeping away from temptations of one's lower self, abandonment of lust, and exercise of self control (*ṣabr*) in the most difficult and unpleasant situations of life, or fatiguing forms of worship. When one masters all this, he has really attained the desired attachment to God (*ḥaqīqatu'l-ittiṣāl*). He will then become a real ascetic, consciously and rightly following the spirit of religion. He will never lose the virtues which he has acquired, and will always be ready to help others to seek salvation. He will never turn from the path leading to spiritual benefit (*ṣalāḥ*) for fear of its difficulties, or out of the desire to conceal (*taqiyyatan*) what he has acquired from others. He will be always kind, generous and magnanimous to all.

77. Paying the *zakāt*, or religious tax, is obligatory upon every one who possesses a certain minimum of income. Money in the world is similar to blood in human body. When it accumulates beyond a certain limit, it causes harm to the organism, injuring the health. Therefore it is necessary to adjust the balance regul-

arly, preventing undesirable developments, by contributing a certain share in the income for the purposes of general benefit of the community.

78. Fast, as a religious practice, is introduced in order to imitate the example of the angels, who do not possess human weaknesses and defects. It is obligatory, and has many spiritual advantages in so far as it helps to suppress sensuality. But in addition to fast as abstention from ordinary food and drink, there also is a fast in the spiritual sense which consists in the religious duty of not communicating or teaching any religious matters, on the part of those who do not possess the necessary qualifications, and are not licenced to do this. The inner meaning of the fast is explained in special books.

79. Ḥajj, or pilgrimage to the sanctuary of Mekka, is obligatory upon all who can afford the expenses it entails. All the rites prescribed for it are important, nothing in it should be neglected or overlooked. There is a great deal of important symbolism in its ceremonies; this is explained in books which specially deal with the question.

80. Religious war (*jihād*) is obligatory (*wājib*) against the people who turn away from religion. When one is called to discharge this duty, he is bound (*mukallaf*) to take it up under the guidance of the right leader (*imām*), or under whomsoever the latter chooses and commissions

to act on his behalf. If the *mu'min* loses his life while discharging the duty of *jihād*, he acquires special nearness to God. Apart from ordinary war for religion, the *jihād* can have yet another form. This is the struggle against one's own vices and sensuality which make him deviate from the right path prescribed by religion (*shar'*). This spiritual war against one's self is only permitted to those who possess the necessary qualifications of *'ilm* and *'amal*, i.e. theoretical education and practical religious training.

81. Life after death is not similar to this existence (*ākhira .... dār ghayr hādhihi'd-dār aṭ-ṭabī'iyya*). It is never affected by decay, belonging to the realm of purity, cleanliness and truth. Only those souls will attain it, after the separation from their bodies, which during their earthly life have freed themselves from the impurity of sin, from erroneous beliefs, etc., and who have acquired real virtues.

Cf. art. 71. The ordinary Muslim eschatology is usually understood as a series of symbols and allegories. For details about what happens with the soul after death see art. 93 and 94.

82. The judgement (*ḥisāb*), and rising in flesh (*ḥashr*) on the Last Day, punishment and reward, are all true because all the great prophets have revealed these matters to mankind.

These beliefs are understood symbolically, not literally. Many Ismaili authors prefer the expression *as-Sā'a* (also used by Nasafī, 315), for the designation of the Resurrection, to the usual *yawmu'l-Qiyāma*.

83. Reward (*jazā'*) and punishment (*'iqāb*) after death are true. Just as the body grows and exists by assimilating the foods which it consumes, so the soul lives by the revelations and regulations of the religion which it follows. As the body and soul are inseparably connected, so are the correct religious beliefs and righteous actions of mankind. As a sound body is long-lived and active, so a sound and clean mind is capable of acquiring high wisdom which will carry the soul to the angelic state after the death of the body. Those men whose actions are contrary to the prescriptions of religion reveal the wickedness of their natures, and will receive all the punishments which religion enjoins. Such punishments, which affect the body, affect the soul, too. The body perishes, returning to the elements. The soul feels the need for possessing reason, but does not find it (cf. art. 90); it seeks for a body in which it could have a heart, but this it also cannot find. Its evil actions enclose it as an armour, which holds it, and tortures it. It cannot attain the angelic state (*malakūt*), and is powerless to dissociate itself from what it no longer likes to be associated with. Every one who violates the law (*nāmūs*) of the Creator, intended for the general welfare of His creatures, harms himself; and the community, to which he belongs, has the right to take necessary measures against him.

Cf. Nasafī, 310; F.A. III, art. 26. About free will, alluded to here (also art. 84 and 86), cf. Nasafī, ibid.; F. A. III is rather restrained on this point. On soul and body see art. 90.

84. Reward (*jazā'*) is inevitable, in future life (*fī ghayr hādhihi'd-dār*). The human soul is living (*ḥayy*), and endowed with (free) power (*qādir*) to do good or evil, to obey or to disobey God. If both kinds of its actions would be treated in the same way, there would be no sign of God's rule (*siyāsa*), or order in the world, according to which good and obedient souls are preferred to those which are not good and not obedient. Then chaos would reign, and all would fall in confusion. But as it is the will of God that signs of His greatness and omnipotence should be manifest, and that His mastership over the world should be asserted, then reward is to follow every action of man, who first receives commandments as to things permissible and prohibited. If an individual (*shakhṣ*) acts, the mere fact of his acting does not carry in itself either praise or condemnation. All depends on the motives of the action. If he acts against the law (*siyāsa*) given by a prophet, and is punished, e.g., by his hand being cut, or by being beheaded, the punishment would be only partial: the hand is merely a part of the body, not of the soul also. As the justice of God is beyond doubt, it is indubitable that the soul will also be punished. Mankind is composed of individuals, and an individual is composed of a soul and body. The soul is capable of distinguishing between passing pleasures, derived from the experience of senses, and between eternal spiritual happiness. Accordingly, the soul will receive either the reward (*thawāb*) or punishment (*'iqāb*), depending on whether it seeks eternal obedience

to God, or merely passing pleasures, despite disobeying the commandments of God, acting against the prescriptions of His Apostles. But God is not only just, but also merciful. He guides mankind, through His Apostles, to what is good. Therefore He has the right to punish the obstinate and the ungrateful who do not accept His guidance, and persist in doing evil. But the world is continually changing, and thus final and eternal reward or punishment must be received in the abode other than this world, the abode of eternity.

85. Every thing that exists is derived from the four *ṭabā'i'*, or "temperaments". The visible world consists of their combinations, which become more and more complex as one rises from inorganic nature to the highly developed organisms, and to man. Their distribution is in the hands of "wise angels", *malā'ika 'uqalā'*, who instantly and without fail bring them into action in accordance with the command of God.

This is apparently inserted for linking up the theory of the *ṭabā'i'* with religion. Cf. art. 23.

86. Man is the choisest creation (*ṣafwa*) of the world. He seeks to approach his Creator, of his own accord, not by any compulsion (*li-af'āli-hi'l-ikhtiyāriyya dūna'l-jabriyya*). Everything in the material world is composed of four elements (*ummahāt*), i.e. fire, air, water and earth. Man has in him the finest form of fire, — the light of his reason; the finest form of air, — his speech; the purest water, — the essence of his

life; and the purest earth, in the form of the foods absorbed by his body. Being the crown of creation, and endowed with the highest psychical abilities, such as reason, thought, etc., man is free in his actions. These actions all are recorded in the Celestial Book, the *Lawḥ Maḥfūẓ*. He possesses also the (psychical) power of will, by which he controls, and to some extent masters, his body. God does not force him to act in this or that way, but gives him His help if he prays for it.

Cf. art. 83 and 84. The real purpose of this seems to include the *ummahāt* into religious dogma.

87. God knows everything what happens with or in His creations, whether it is open or secret, and nothing can be hidden from Him. God does not disclose to man the date of his death in order to make him strive to attain a greater degree of moral perfection. Those who purify their minds, and obey God, may gradually attain the state when the lights of the Realities are kindled in them by the angels, higher knowledge becomes accessible to them (*yūḥā ilay-hi wa yulqā 'alay-hi*), and they receive the highest equality and the greatest happiness (*al-qisṭu'l-a'ẓam wa'l-ḥaẓẓu'l-ajzal*). Obstructing veils then become torn before their spiritual vision, and they begin to know many things which are normally hidden from mankind.

This sounds quite Sufic, and is clearer when read together with art. 94. Cf. also art. 89.

88. Daily bread neither comes from the personal effort of man, nor can be stopped by

human interference, but is given (or taken away) by Divine Command. God has created this world in perfect order, and, through His angels, has caused the spheres, stars, etc., to move smoothly, as a good and well regulated mechanism. In this perfect system every living creature is provided with all its necessities. In the case of man it happens that one has better luck than others, and therefore becomes richer than the others, who always remains poor. But the chances are originally equal. Why such a difference occurs,—this is a mystery of God's predestination.

Cf. Nasafī, 311 ; F. A. III, art. 21.

89. The length of the lives of man in this world is fixed by Divine decree, and cannot be altered. God, however, can prolong the lives of those who lead pious lives; He may shorten the lives of the impious and vile.

Cf. art. 87 ; also Nasafī, 311 ; F. A. III, art. 21.

90. The human (conscious) soul (*nafs*) can neither acquire knowledge nor act before it is joined with the body which it is destined to animate, and has no (separate) source of being (*'ayn mawjūda*). The soul, being a substance capable of acquiring and possessing knowledge, is coupled with the body. In combination with the latter it forms a Universe in miniature, a prototype of the visible world. The knowledge of the world is not found in the intellect, but is gradually acquired by it, through the experience of the senses. Thus the body is necessary

to its functioning and attainment of knowledge, apart from its being necessary for its existence in the physical world. The knowledge gathered by the soul can either be acquired directly from observation of the world, or received from the Imams, of whom one is always present in the Universe, though sometimes he may be concealed.

About human knowledge cf. Nasafī, 308-309; F. A. III, art. 1 and 2; Ghazzālī, in his *Mishkātu'l-anwār*, deals at length with this subject.

91. The innate reasoning faculty (*al-'aql al-gharīzī*) is the instrument for the acquirement of knowledge (*ma'rifa*); the soul hunts (*tataṣayyad*) with it for ideas (*ma'ārif*), concerning both the spiritual and the material worlds. It is like a sword, which does not kill by itself, but is an instrument for killing. Similarly, reason, by itself, does not contain the knowledge of things in general (*mujarradatan*), but acquires it when it is aided by the help of God (*yaṣḥabuhu't-tawfīq mina'l-lāh*). Such help (*tawfīq*) is a special blessing of God; only those who possess faith (*ahlu'l-īmān*) are privileged to have it in the best and fullest degree. It is unwise to think that one can only limit himself with the experience of the outer material world, and to rely on it. True knowledge can only be received from the Founder of the religion, or the Imams, who continue his work, and who teach mankind for its own benefit.

92. The soul, by its nature (*jawhar*), is living (*ḥayy*), willing (*qādir*), and though originally it does not possess knowledge, it is capable of acquiring it. It is the real inner mover

of the body, the source of its activities. Its life, will, and cognition are innate qualities, which neither appear with time, nor can be added from outside. The author gives a long dissertation on the relations between the Substance and *Accidens* (*'arad*), with special regard to "movement", i.e. activity. He explains how it can be directed towards any reasonable aim and purpose.

Cf. art. 84.

93. The soul becomes separated from the body after death, and goes to the realm of spirits. Those souls whose activities are in agreement with the commandments of God attain an angelic state, while the soul of the disobedient will join Iblīs. Decomposition of the body does not affect the soul; the body returns to the elements of which it is composed, and which again can become involved in the building up of new plants, animals, and even human bodies by direct and indirect assimilation with their tissues. But soul has nothing to do with this process. According to the indications of the Coran and of tradition, the soul is eternal, and does not perish after death.

This is a reply to the heresiologists who attribute to the Ismailis belief in metempsychosis.

94. What does the soul attain after its separation from the body?—God calls us, through His intermediaries (*wasā'iṭ*) to accept His commandments, conveyed by His messengers, who give information about the Other World. The latter is the world of ideas (*ṣiwariyya*), while

this world, in which we live, is material (*mādd-diyya*). The human soul (*nafs*) can be given the possibility of admittance to the realm of ideas (*ad-dār aṣ-ṣiwariyya*). It always strains the psychical faculties with which it is endowed by nature, such as imagination, thought, its *jawhar* (=life or preservation instinct?), illuminating flashes of reason, and *ta'yīdāt*, or inner Divine illumination, which it receives with the help of intermediaries between God and man;— all this it does in order to learn something about the Other World. The soul seeks for right elucidation (*an-nāṭiqa*) of that world; it should be abstract, rational, adequate to (that world's original) idea (*ṣūra*), which it explains, implying (*muttaḥida*) that world's excellence and its faculty of attainment of perfection. With the help of its imagination the soul is able to form a (general) idea (*ṣūra*) of this world, which it abstracts from its materiality. Such abstraction is composed of substances of angels (*dhawātu'l-malā'ika*),—as elemental forces,—and of ideas (*ṣiwar*). The soul continues to increase its knowledge, and its psychical faculties never cease inquiring until it goes to receive the order of God (*amr*), by which it becomes ready to possess the blessing of reason and love (*uns*), inseparably united with it. Then it becomes free from the necessity of paying attention to the body, and the demands with which its senses bother it. Its distraction between the intellect and body, which always requires nurishing, ceases, and does not break the final spiritual union (*al-ittiṣāl al-kullī*). At the moment of

death, and separation of the soul from the body, all impeding veils are lifted, and the union becomes final, because the soul remains for ever abiding in *tawḥīd*, or unitarian contemplation of God. This is accompanied by the blessing which the immediate Creator (*Mubdi'*) bestows upon it, endowing it with the highest perfections which human speech is powerless to describe. The soul then remains in the World of Reward (*dāru'th-thawāb*), which is unchangeable and enternal.

Here only so much can be said. Those who wish to know more about this should seek for information elsewhere (i.e. in works on *ḥaqā'iq*).

The Sufic spirit of this *i'tiqād* is really striking. Explanation of some terms: *wasā'iṭ* obviously implies both prophets and Imams. *Jawhar* of the *nafs* perhaps may mean the synthesis of psychical faculties. *Angels* obviously are Platonic ideas, or abstractions of natural phenomena (cf. art. 23, 85). The *soul*, as essentially life-principle, most probably becomes synthetized with the *'aql* principle when it is no longer entangled with carnal self. *Uns*, friendship, obviously is the same as Sufic *'ishq*, or Plotinian *love*, or beauty. The Sufis call the state which is described here *baqā' bi'l-lāh*, or *fanā' fī'l-lāh*. Cf. also Ṭūsī, *taṣawwur* xxi (JRAS, 1931, p. 551).

95. With regard to the determination (*jabr*), or freedom of the will, or choice (*takhyīr*), man is not free in everything that is concerned with the physiological functions of his body, those which proceed unconsciously. But he can exercize his free choice in his psychical functions, and in those physiological ones which require conscious effort. His body is composite, but the soul (*nafs*) is simple and spiritual (*basīṭ*), and these two are subject to different laws. The simple spiritual (*basīṭ*) substance cannot be

shaped into a form from outside,—this is only possible with the (material) composite entity (*murakkab*), which is given a form by the factors of the outside world. Thus the simple spiritual (*basīṭ*) substance is superior to the composite, and can exercise its influence upon it, without being (physically) affected: the soul can know, wish, etc., anything. The reason for this state of things is that God has created them in this way. The soul is free to act. Otherwise why should God send His Prophets to persuade it to act in accordance with His will? There are many passages in the Coran in which it is clearly stated that the human soul acts neither under compulsion nor determination. Therefore its salvation depends entirely on its zeal for good and righteous behaviour.

Cf. *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*, 19. For orthodox ideas cf. Nasafī, 310.

96. Predestination, *qaḍā'*, and *qadar*, or eternal Decree both really exist, and are not merely a metaphor. They are what the Creator has pre-arranged; this, however, He did not by *jabr*, or determination, i.e. forcing souls to act in such a way as to either deserve Paradise or Hell. If everything was pre-determined from the beginning, there would be no need for God to send His prophets, or reveal His law and books, in which vice is condemned, and virtue praised. In the case of pre-determination there would be no difference between an idolater and monotheist,—neither the first would deserve punishment, nor the second deserve his reward. The Revealed Book and the prescriptions of religion do not

permit us to hold such views. Both *qaḍā'* and *qadar* are defined in the Coran itself. Both the terms are used in different senses, and have several shadings, though originally they imply one and the same thing.

Qaḍā' implies the meaning of performance, completion, solution, finishing (*farāgh*), discharging a duty, etc. (Perhaps the best meaning would be — chance). As in the case of one who goes somewhere, without knowing where he goes, or wishing to go there.

The term *qadar* comes from *miqdār*, which means measure, quantity. It also has some shading of *tartīb*, or pre-arrangement, in a special meaning; or it may be the same as *taqdīr*, i.e. arrangement, fixing a measure. This term is used in eight different senses:

1. In its application to the uniformity and consistency of the laws of nature, which act automatically, coming from one source.

2. In its application to the reproduction of species within a genus, when all the characteristic features are always repeated, invariably reappear, and cannot be arbitrarily altered or cancelled.

3. In its application to the unchangeable differences in the position and development of different classes of creatures. In accordance with these, man is the most perfect creation, because the world was created for his sake.

4. In its application to the circumstances in which the worth of man is tested, with all his qualities, mental and physical. All depends on collaboration between reason and soul, thought

and heart, and the correct distinction between true and false.

5. In its application to the law according to which every living being has the power of obtaining its subsistance, and the food which it consumes makes the bodies grow and exist. The Creator has endowed every living creature with capabilities to find its food.

6. In its application to the religious law (*sharī'a*) and its injunctions and prohibitions, which are final, and cannot be either discharged or not, at will.

7. In its application to the foresight of human genius, which man receives from the Creator as an essential ingredient of his nature.

8. In application to the definition of things lawful and those which deserve punishment. Man must know these, though he cannot comprehend the reason why one is good and the other bad, in accordance with the guidance of religion. Knowledge is acquired from the experience of the senses. But as these cannot perceive such reasons, man should depend on Divine revelation, which should be obeyed unreservedly,

The Prophet, being asked what is the difference between *qaḍā'* and *qadar*, replied that this is the mystery of God. God does not want mankind to obey perforce, and though He is omnipotent, He wants every soul to obey by being faithful to His covenant (*'ahd*).

Ḥasan Baṣrī wrote to Imam Ḥusayn b. 'Alī, asking him the same question. Imam Ḥusayn replied that whosoever rejects the belief in *qaḍā'*

and *qadar*, is a *kāfir*. Whosoever makes God responsible for human disobedience is a sinner (*fājir*). God cannot be obeyed by compulsion (*ikrāh*), and disobedience cannot be justified by the force of circumstances (*ghalba*). There is no *jabr*, or determination. God gives every one the possibility to act by free will, and, if he wishes, to attain salvation.

Cf. F.A. II, art. 5 and sq., with corresponding articles in F.A. I, the *Waṣiyya* of Abū Ḥanīfa, etc., quoted by Wensinck. Also Nasafī, 310. Tūsī (JRAS, 1931, p. 547) also admits freedom of will, and does not accept Predestination literally.

97. It is right to believe that an unqualified person (lit. "beginner" *mubtadi'*) should not discuss religious matters, or ponder over the acts of God. Just as a small child should obey its parents without criticising their orders, being unable to understand properly the motives of their actions, so the beginner should be prohibited to do this until he is sufficiently qualified to preach to others.

Cf. art. 59. In art. 62 conscious attitude, not "childlike faith" is advocated.

98. (Conditional) permission (*idhn*), and absolute authority (*iṭlāq*) in handling religious matters normally depend on individual advancement in studies, and on moral qualities of the aspirant.

99. One must be sincere in discharging his religious duties, and must not have some ulterior motive in them. Insincerity completely annihilates the meaning and purpose of worship.

100. The human soul has an eternal existence (*baqā'*) after the death of the body, and never dies. God has not created the world for nothing, nor has He given His Divine law to mankind as a play. He does not destroy eternal spiritual substances (*al-basā'iṭ al-abadiyya*). The body returns to the original material elements from which it is composed. The soul, which belongs to the world of Divine Will (*amr*), or spiritual world, knows no decomposition.

Cf. articles 93—95.

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Abbreviations: A = *'Ahdu'l-awliyā'*; D = *Da'ā'imu'l-Islām*; Kh = *Khazīnatu'l-adilla*; Md = Muḥammad; n. = note, in small type.

The Arabic definite article *al-* is disregarded in alphabetic arrangement.

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ERRATA

Page 2, line 32. For *ghuluw* read *ghuluww*.
,, 9, ,, 4. ,, "second" read "third".
,, 38, ,, 20. ,, *'ulūmi-humā* read *'ulūmi-himā*.
,, 48, ,, 13. Insert a comma instead of semicolon after "faith".
,, ,, ,, 20. For *shakṣ* read *shakhṣ*.

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